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People maintain systems of beliefs that provide them with a sense of belongingness,
control, identity, and meaning, more generally. Recent research shows that when these
beliefs are threatened a syndrome of negatively valenced arousal is evoked that motivates
people to seek comfort in their ideologies or other personally valued beliefs. In this paper
wewill provide an overview of this process and discuss areas for future research. Beginning
with the neural foundations ofmeaning violations, we reviewﬁndings that show the anterior
cingulate cortex is responsible for detecting inconsistencies, and importantly, that this is
experienced as aversive. Next, we evaluate the evidential support for a psychophysiological
arousal response as measured by cardiography and skin conductance. We discuss how
current theorizing proposes that subsequent behavioral approach ameliorates the negative
arousal and serves as an effective, well-adapted coping response, but we also aim to
further integrate this process in the existing threat-compensation literature. Finally, we
speculate on whether approach motivation is likely to result when one feels capable of
handling the threat, thereby incorporating the biopsychosocial model that distinguishes
between challenge and threat into the motivational threat-response literature. We believe
the current literature on threat and meaning has much to offer and we aim to provide new
incentives for further development.
Keywords: meaning violation, threat, approach motivation, avoidance motivation, BIS/BAS
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the last half a century, research on coping
has identiﬁed a plurality of ways that people deal with stress
(Zimmer-Gembeck and Skinner, 2010). To illustrate, people com-
monly ﬁnd comfort in actions such as seeking out social contacts,
engaging in wishful thinking, eating comforting foods and tak-
ing hot showers. As we will argue in this review, people will also
approach and afﬁrm committed values, ideals, ideologies, and
worldviews. Generally, comfort is sought in response to threat-
ening experiences, and we believe that the threat-compensation
literature has much to offer on the topic of self-comforting strate-
gies. In this literature an integrative picture is emerging that states
motivational processes underlie the response to a certain class of
stressors we describe as meaning violations (e.g., McGregor et al.,
2010; Proulx et al., 2012). It is argued that when facedwith amean-
ing violation, people show an initial defensive reaction marked by
anxiety, vigilance, and avoidance, which subsequently switches to
a motivational state of behavioral approach that ameliorates this
anxiety, thereby serving a palliative, self-comforting function. In
this review, we will provide an overview of the neuroaffective and
psychophysiological processes that have been linked to the typical
compensation behavior of the threat-compensation literature, and
suggest directions for future research in this ﬁeld.
DEFINING MEANING VIOLATIONS
The threat-compensation literature is ﬁlled with psychological
theories aimed at describing and understanding people’s reac-
tions to particular types of threat (Proulx, 2012). Of these threats,
traumatic experiences (e.g., sexual abuse, natural disasters, violent
attacks) undoubtedly rank among themost impactful. These expe-
riences threaten core motivations such as our desire to avoid death
and attain personal control—twomotives that have receivedmuch
attention in the social psychological literature, framed in terms of
prominent perspectives such as terror management theory (Burke
et al., 2010) and compensatory control theory (Kay et al., 2009).
Traumatic experiences, however, do not simply create a single dose
of proximal anxiety. In addition to the clear physical hazards they
often represent, they also impact the way in which we understand
ourselves andourworld. Instead of living in a safe and justworld—
a common assumption—they force us to realize we live in a world
of danger and injustice. This implication initiates a second “dose”
of anxiety (Janoff-Bulman, 1992), whereby the threat to physi-
cal safety is compounded by shattered assumptions. Although the
context of a traumatic experience easily evokes the understand-
ing that related cognitions are important for well-being, Bruner
and Postman (1949) used a relatively trivial perceptual anomaly to
reach similar conclusions. They presented people with reverse col-
ored playing cards (e.g., a black two of hearts) an experience that
did not match their expectations, which elicited signs of personal
distress.
Cognitive dissonance theory has formally described this mis-
match between beliefs and experiences along with the aver-
sive feeling of dissonance that results (Festinger, 1957, or see
Brehm, 2007). Subsequent theorists have developed this focus
on cognitive consistency and uncertainty. For example, lay
epistemic theory (Kruglanski et al., 2010), self-veriﬁcation theory
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(Swann and Read, 1981), and uncertainty management theories
(e.g., Uncertainty Reduction, Hogg, 2007; Uncertainty Manage-
ment, van den Bos, 2001) all focus on a motivation to replace dis-
sonant cognitionswith consonant cognitions andperceived clarity.
One way to achieve this is by assimilating experiences so that they
are consistentwith one’s expectations. Bruner andPostman (1949)
found that people often reported not seeing a black two of hearts,
but actually an expectancy-congruent black two of spades. Alter-
natively, they could have accommodated their understanding by
realizing theywere perceiving an altered deck of playing cards. This
form of dissonance reduction was commonly reported in clas-
sic cognitive dissonance paradigms where participants—mostly
students—were induced to behave in ways that contradicted their
attitudes (e.g., argue in favor of a tuition increase). Subsequent
accommodation of the dissonant behavior took place in the form
of a change in attitude toward the tuition fee, thereby resolving
the dissonance. In sum, assimilation, and accommodation can
be seen as compensatory responses to resolve inconsistencies in
cognitions.
Psychologists have furthermore observed that in addition to
assimilation and accommodation, people can show a heightened
commitment to alternative beliefs or values following many of
the same inconsistencies that elicit assimilation or accommoda-
tion behaviors. For example, arguing for a tuition increase results
in a change in attitude toward the tuition fee, but not if partici-
pants are ﬁrst given the opportunity to afﬁrm of unrelated values
such as political beliefs (Steele and Liu, 1983). Hundreds of sub-
sequent studies have shown active afﬁrmation of values following
reminders of mortality (Burke et al., 2010), lack of control (e.g.,
Kay et al., 2010), and the experience of uncertainty (e.g., van den
Bos et al., 2006).
The abundance of threat-related theories almost invariably led
to the development of more integrative perspectives. According
to the meaning maintenance model (MMM; Heine et al., 2006;
Proulx and Inzlicht, 2012), any inconsistency between experi-
ence and expectation evokes a syndrome of negative arousal
that motivates compensation efforts. According to the reactive
approachmotivationmodel (RAM;McGregor et al., 2010), threats
represent cues to goal conﬂicts that cause anxious uncertainty
that serves an approach motivation function. More generally,
these integrative models all frame threat-compensation effects
in terms of discrepancies between perceptions, beliefs, or con-
ﬂicting motivations. We see these discrepancies as affecting
meaning, or the expected relationships that allow us to make
sense of our experiences. To distinguish between threats that
stem from negatively self-relevant situations (e.g., a dangerous
predator, a robber) and sources of inconsistency [e.g., paradigm
violations (Bruner and Postman, 1949), prediction errors (Haj-
cak and Foti, 2008)] that affect psychological motivation, we
refer to the latter as meaning violations. While meaning vio-
lations may also have negatively self-relevant implications [e.g.,
worldview-violating personal tragedies (Janoff-Bulman, 1992)],
the presence of inconsistency may be both necessary and sufﬁ-
cient to evoke the state of uncertainty that underlies the common
aversive reactions, whether they follow from existential reminders,
lack of control, behavioral dissonance, epistemic uncertainty
or goal conﬂicts. This is followed by a compensatory reaction
that resolves the aversive uncertainty caused by the meaning
violation.
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MEANING VIOLATIONS
BEHAVIORAL APPROACH AND FRONTAL ASYMMETRY
Gray (1982) published “The Neuropsychology of Anxiety” (since
updated; Gray and McNaughton, 2003) that describes anxiety
as activity of the behavioral inhibition system (BIS). A threat,
however, generated, activates the BIS and produces behavioral
inhibition, heightened arousal, and increased vigilance. As a result,
ongoing behavior is halted and the environment is scanned for
further threatening cues. In contrast to the behavioral inhibition
system, a second system is responsible for reengaging behavior,
known as the behavioral approach system (BAS; also known as
the behavioral activation system). The BAS responds to reward
cues, non-punishment and escape from punishment. This state
is marked by attentional narrowing and feelings of hope, elation,
and happiness.
Gray’s model of anxiety is mainly a neuropsychological model
and, and while it is based in large part based on animal models,
several human neurophysiological substrates have been proposed
to underlie the BAS and BIS. Some of these substrates are now
being investigated in the context of meaning violations. These
involve the frontal areas of the brain, potentially the lateral and
orbital regions of the prefrontal cortex. This is based on studies
showing asymmetrical activation in frontal areas during approach
and avoidance motivations (see, Davidson, 1992; Coan and Allen,
2003). Various psychological states elicit a frontal asymmetry that
is consistent with a BAS state interpretation. For instance, Sutton
and Davidson (1997) measured prefrontal asymmetry using EEG
and linked this to self-report measures of BIS and BAS, using the
BIS/BAS scale developed by Carver and White (1994).
The BAS scale assesses people’s tendency to experience positive
affect and behavioral activation in goal-oriented situations. The
BIS scale assesses the tendency to experience negative affect and
behavioral inhibition in the face of threats. Sutton and Davidson
(1997) found that greater left prefrontal activation was correlated
with higher levels of BAS strength, whereas those with greater
relative right prefrontal activity reported greater BIS strength.
They also ruled out alternative explanations such as positive and
negative affect confounds that are associated with BAS and BIS,
respectively. These ﬁndings have also been shown in a study by
Harmon-Jones andAllen (1997), who linked frontal cortical activ-
ity to self-report measures of BIS and BAS. Pizzagalli et al. (2005)
performed a source localization study to gainmore insight into the
underlying structures responsible for the asymmetry. They found
a correlation between activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal and
medial orbitofrontal regions and a bias for reward-related cues
[also see Berkman and Lieberman (2010)]. This further supports
not only the relationship between frontal asymmetry and BAS,
but also provides some insight into the anatomical details of this
relationship.
At ﬁrst, however, it was believed that frontal asymmetry was
related to emotional valence, with greater left frontal asymmetry
being linked to positive affective processing styles and vice versa
(Fox, 1991; Jones and Fox, 1992; Wheeler et al., 1993). Yet, the
previously discussed studies show the functioning is less related to
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emotional valence, and actually favor a motivational orientation
interpretation. One particular study by Berkman and Lieberman
(2010) has demonstrated that prefrontal asymmetry is associated
with action motivation and not with stimulus valence. In their
study, they compared approach/avoidance actions vs. stimulus
valence using a novel goal pursuit task. Functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (fMRI) revealed an increased left activation in
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during approach (vs. avoidance)
actions irrespective of the valence of the stimulus. No such asym-
metry was observed for pleasant compared to unpleasant stimuli.
Additionally, individual differences in approach–avoidance moti-
vation moderated the effect such that increasing trait approach
motivation was associated with greater left-sided asymmetry
during approach actions.
This interpretation, that frontal asymmetry reﬂects BAS, is
further bolstered by studies linking frontal asymmetry to psycho-
logical constructs related to BAS motivation, such as depression
and anger. Depression is argued to consist partially of a lack of
motivation to approach. Consistently, depression has been linked
to lower levels of relative left frontal activity (Henriques and
Davidson,1990;Allen et al., 1993). Anger, despite having anegative
affective valence, has also been linked to greater left frontal activity
(Harmon-Jones and Allen, 1998; Harmon-Jones, 2003). The link
between anger and frontal asymmetry has also been supported
through means of transcranial magnetic stimulation; which has
shown that decreasing activity in the left prefrontal cortex lowers
a memory bias for angry faces (van Honk and Schutter, 2006).
Frontal asymmetry has also been shown in people who are in a
promotion-oriented state (i.e., focused on gaining reward instead
of avoiding losses), as opposed to an avoidance orientated state
(Amodio et al., 2004). Finally, affecting frontal asymmetry through
biofeedback techniques has been shown to increase self-reported
affect and facial muscle activity in response to emotionally evoca-
tive ﬁlm clips (Allen et al., 2001). These ﬁndings thus support
the interpretation that frontal asymmetry is related to behavioral
activation.
BEHAVIORAL INHIBITION AND THE ANTERIOR CINGULATE CORTEX
Although many studies show a link between frontal asymme-
try and behavioral activation-related outcome measures, the link
between frontal asymmetry and behavioral inhibition is not always
shown (Coan andAllen, 2003). Often studies lack the potential for
greater insight into to the anatomical functioning of the under-
lying structures (Davidson, 2004), mostly due to the fact that
non-spatial sensitive measures such as EEG are being used (but
see Berkman and Lieberman, 2010 for an exception). EEG studies
have, however, found other potential markers for BIS activation,
and these markers have also been linked to meaning violations.
These markers suggest the involvement of the anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC). The ACC receives input from the limbic lobe,
including the orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala, as well as
other nociceptive sources. For this reason it has been argued that
the ACC serves a critical function for emotional and motivational
factors (Pandya et al., 1981; Van Hoesen et al., 1993; Vogt et al.,
1993; Morecraft and Van Hoesen, 1998; Bush et al., 2000).
The exact function of theACC is still controversial. Research on
error related negativity (ERN) suggests various possibilities. The
ERN is a negative voltage deﬂection measured over the fronto-
central scalp that appears to reﬂect activation of theACC (Dehaene
et al., 1994; Miltner et al., 1997). The ERN is elicited when people
commit errors, or speciﬁcally, when they receive feedback about
having committed an error, and usually appears between 50 and
100 ms after the feedback (Falkenstein et al., 1990; Gehring et al.,
1993; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). Various models of the function of
ERNs exist and they suggest that the ERN reﬂects either a conﬂict
monitoring function (Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004)
or an evaluative function based on expectations developed dur-
ing learning history (reinforcement-learning theory; Holroyd and
Coles, 2002). In the latter construal, the ERN is an indication
that events are worse than anticipated, or better than expected.
Luu et al. (2000) have proposed that the ERN may signify affec-
tive processing in response to errors. This proposal is based on
evidence that the magnitude of the ERN is affected by moti-
vational and affective variables. Individuals with symptoms of
depression (Chiu and Deldin, 2007), obsessive–compulsive disor-
der (Gehring et al., 2000; Hajcak and Simons, 2002; Hajcak et al.,
2008), and generalized anxiety (Hajcak et al., 2003, 2004) show
greater ERNs. Additionally, ERN activity has been associated with
stronger skin conductance responses (Hajcak et al., 2004) and a
more pronounced startle response following threat (Hajcak and
Foti, 2008), while removal of this brain structure is associated
with ﬂat affect and a lack of distress (Corkin et al., 1979; Critch-
ley et al., 2003). Similar to previously mentioned studying linking
self-reported BAS to frontal asymmetry, Amodio et al. (2008) have
linked self-reported BIS toACC functioning. They found that self-
reported BIS was uniquely related to the ERN in a Go/No-Go task,
but not self-reported BAS. Moreover, BIS was also related to the
N2, a negative potential that peaks about 250 ms after the onset of
a No-Go trial; and is believed to arise similarly from the ACC (van
Veen and Carter, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). These ﬁndings,
and those discussed earlier, point toward the ACC being a crucial
component of the BIS.
One of the most interesting ﬁndings in the threat-
compensation literature has been that the ACC responds similarly
to what we describe as meaning violations. For example, Quirin
et al. (2012) showed that by letting participants answer ques-
tions about their fear of death, increased ACC activation could
be observed (as well as activation in the amygdala and the caudate
nucleus). TheACCactivated relative to answering questions about
dental pain, indicating this effect can go beyond that of negatively
self-relevant events. ACC activation has also been demonstrated
in response to the experience of cognitive dissonance. For exam-
ple, Kitayama et al. (2013) asked participants to make decisions
regarding CDs that differed in attractiveness, sometimes facing an
easy choice (between two CDs that differ greatly in attractiveness,
i.e., no cognitive dissonance) and a sometimes difﬁcult choice
(between two CDs that are similar in attractiveness, i.e., cognitive
dissonance). They found that the cognitive dissonance eliciting
choices resulted in activation of the dorsal ACC. Additionally, they
found that these choices also resulted in activation of areas related
to emotional distress (left anterior insula). Furthermore, they
could predict a change in attitude toward the CDs that resolves
the cognitive dissonance with activity in the posterior cingulate
cortex. van Veen et al. (2009) used a similar setup to also predict
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attitude change based on neural activity in the cingulate cortex.
They scanned participants with fMRI while they argued that the
scanner environment—an uncomfortable environment—was, in
fact, comfortable. Activity in the dorsal ACC, as well as activity
in the anterior insula, predicted their change in attitude. These
ﬁndings point toward a role of the ACC in resolving cognitive
dissonance.
Additional studies have linked the ACC to meaning viola-
tions. For example, Salomons et al. (2004) manipulated the
controllability over a painful stimulus and found that having
less control was associated with increased ACC activity. Goal
uncertainty has also been found to affect the ACC (Tullett et al.,
2013), and a line of research has revealed that the ACC also
plays a prominent role in how people respond to experiences
of social isolation. In this line of research, participants play a
ball tossing game (ostensibly) with other participants, who at
a certain point stop throwing balls to the participant, or do
so with such a low frequency that the participant experiences
a lack of social inclusion. These studies consistently show cues
of ostracism (not receiving the ball) evoke activity in the ACC
(Eisenberger et al., 2003; Masten et al., 2009; Bolling et al., 2011,
2012; Moor et al., 2012). Some argue that part of the role of
the ACC is due to the unexpected nature of not receiving a ball,
and thus point to violation of expectations (e.g., Bolling et al.,
2011). Indeed, expectancy violation as been argued to be the
root cause of the aversiveness that follows from meaning viola-
tions (Proulx and Inzlicht, 2012) and is related to ACC activity
(Oliveira et al., 2007).
BEHAVIORAL INHIBITION AND CARDIOVASCULAR THREAT RESPONSE
Physiological indications of meaning violations are not lim-
ited to neural responses. The biopsychosocial model (BPSM)
of arousal regulation (Blascovich and Tomaka, 1996; Blascovich,
2008) deﬁnes speciﬁc patterns of cardiovascular responses to
threats. Speciﬁcally, the model states that when an individual
faces a threat (i.e., negative appraisal of the situation) a malignant
pattern of increasing cardiac or myocardial performance should
occur, accompanied by stable or increasing vascular resistance
caused by activation of the pituitary-adrenal-cortical (PAC) axis.
PAC activity is thought to be under the control of the brain centers
previously discussed as BIS (Gray and McNaughton, 2003).
Substantial evidence has accumulated supporting the con-
tention that meaning violations also produce marked changes in
sympathetic nervous activity. As early as the late 1960s, it has
been shown that participants forced to choose between similar
alternatives—and therefore experience cognitive dissonance—
show greater decreases in ﬁnger pulse amplitude (Gerard, 1967),
an index of a physiological readiness response as blood ﬂows
away from the periphery of the body. As well, studies show-
ing that performing attitude-discrepant behaviors also leads to
an increased galvanic skin response (GSR; Croyle and Cooper,
1983; Elkin and Leippe, 1986; Harmon-Jones et al., 1996).
Losch and Cacioppo (1990) have offered additional evidence
that cognitive dissonance increases arousal as measured by
GSR, and have further shown that subsequent attitude change
only occurs when people experience this arousal as explicitly
unpleasant.
Other meaning violations, produce similar modes of arousal.
For example, uncertainty about interacting with outgroup mem-
bers has revealed patterns of cardiovascular reactivity consistent
with threat (Blascovich et al., 2001), and so too has the case
of uncertainty produced by the possibility of experiencing an
electric shock (Monat et al., 1972). Similarly, cardiovascular
responses indicating aversive arousal have been observed in partic-
ipants interacting with partners that violate expectancies (Mendes
et al., 2002, 2007), social threat (Hawkley et al., 2011; Van Beest
and Scheepers, 2013) and a combination of these dimensions:
unexpected social rejection (Moor et al., 2010).
APPROACH AS A PALLIATIVE
After the initial aversive response to a meaning violation, peo-
ple show an array of compensatory behaviors. Often, these are
direct attempts to resolve the source of the violation. For example,
people excluded from social interaction increase their interest in
interaction with other people—strangers included (Maner et al.,
2007)—and they try to ﬁt in with others more by increasing their
compliance (Williams, 2007, 2009; Carter-Sowell et al., 2008). Or,
in the case of behavioral dissonance, students who are asked
to argue in favor of a tuition increase will subsequently change
their attitudes to resolve this attitudinally inconsistent behavior
(Harmon-Jones et al., 2008). Alternatively, people may compen-
sate for meaning violations in a manner wholly unrelated to the
initial source of the violation, by, for example, increasing their
commitment to unrelated personal values. This latter process,
termed ﬂuid compensation (Allport, 1943), has received much
attention and is the basis of several integrative models that now
see the pursuit of committed values as a palliative effort to sub-
due the negative arousal caused by meaning violations (McGregor
et al., 2010; Proulx et al., 2012).
PALLIATIVE COMPENSATION
What is palliative about the pursuit of committed values? As we
have discussed, the initial response to threat is the activation of
the behavioral inhibition system that increases vigilance, arousal,
and avoidance. Behavior is halted and the environment is scanned
for an opportunity to either escape from the threat or address the
threat directly. Instead of behavioral inhibition, the person under
threat would prefer a state of behavioral activation, which will
ensue once an opportunity to act has been detected. Such action
canbe directly aimed at resolving the threat (domain-speciﬁc com-
pensation), but action can also involve indirect, relatively abstract
goals and values (domain-general compensation). In other words,
BIS must be turned into BAS. The deﬁning characteristic of BAS
is the approach of a new goal, be it a change in attitude or the
afﬁrmation of abstract ideals.
More recent research has demonstrated that the response to
meaning violations may indeed result in an increased approach
motivation. McGregor et al. (2010) have shown that in response
to uncertainty about academic aptitude, students show a right-
ward error bias in the line-bisection task,which indicates increased
left cerebral hemisphericity. Increased activation in the left hemi-
sphere is in turn associated with the motivation to approach
(Drake and Myers, 2006; Nash et al., 2010), as described earlier.
In a second study, they showed that students also associated their
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own self more with an approach motivation after the uncertainty
manipulation, as measured through an adapted implicit associa-
tion test (Greenwald et al., 1998), especially if the students’ ideals
have been made salient (McGregor et al., 2012).
Research on the predicted positive affect associated with the
motivation to approach has so far not been thoroughly investi-
gated. Existing research is mostly limited to correlational work
that does not fully disentangle positive affect caused by the pos-
itive associations in the environment (e.g., the presence of food
or an attractive person) or the actual approach oriented mindset.
Nonetheless, many studies do show there is a link. Anhedonia—a
diminished capacity to experience pleasure—has been associated
with a decreased approach motivation, and could even serve as a
bettermeasure of hedonic deﬁcit than commonlyusedmeasures of
anhedonia (Germans and Kring, 2000). More generally, approach
motivation has been linked to well-being (see, Elliot, 2008, chap.
24) and many models link approach to positive emotional states
such as excitement and elation, whereas an avoidance motivation
is linked to anxiety and fear (Carver, 2004).
Additional evidence for the positivity associated with approach
comes from research comparing a personal goal either in
approach-oriented terms or avoidance-oriented terms. An
approach-oriented goal (e.g., “I will try to be more entertaining
at parties”) versus an avoidance-oriented goal (e.g., “I will try not
to be such a bore at parties”) leads to greater reports of subjective
well-being. These results have been found for a variety of types of
goals, ranging from general goals to speciﬁc life goals such as aca-
demic and social pursuits (Elliot and Sheldon, 1997; Elliot et al.,
2006). Furthermore, it has been shown that neural correlates of
well-being indicate a link to approach motivation. Greater left vs.
right superior frontal activation has been associated with hedo-
nic well-being and positive affect (Urry et al., 2004). More direct
evidence for this contention can be found in a study by Nash
et al. (2012). They used EEG to measure approach-related frontal
asymmetry and subsequently measured ERN as a result of errors
during a Stroop task and a multi-source interference task. In both
tasks they found that a higher leftward frontal EEG asymmetry
predicted a reduced ERN amplitude. A higher rightward frontal
asymmetry predicted the opposite, an increased ERN amplitude.
This BIS marker is therefore affected by motivational orientation
in such a way that approach seems to reduce the experience of
conﬂict. Although more evidence is required, there is support for
the contention that the motivation to approach is associated with
positive affect and could serve as an effective comforting strategy.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PALLIATIVE COMPENSATION
We have thus far reviewed evidence for the proposition that mean-
ing violations induce a state of anxiety and inhibition, which in
turn must be overcome by approach-oriented behavior. We now
address the extent to which this process is impacted by individ-
ual difference factors, with speciﬁc emphasis on the BPSM of
threat and challenge (Blascovich and Tomaka, 1996). The BPSM
of arousal distinguishes between physiological states associated
with threat and challenge. Challenge results when an individual
evaluates one’s own resources as meeting the demands of the
situation. Threat is the result of demands that we (subjectively)
determine cannot be met. This distinction is often discussed as
an either/or reaction, in that a situation is either perceived as
challenging or threatening. However, this model can be linked
to the response to meaning violation ﬁndings we have reviewed
here. Instead of a meaning violation being immediately catego-
rized as something that can be overcome, we argue that meaning
violations (e.g., experiences of mortality reminders, behavioral
dissonance, or perceptual errors) are responded to as initially
‘threatening,’ that is, affecting our appraisal of the situation as
a conﬂict that potentially exceeds our demands. After this initial
response, various factors inﬂuence whether the meaning violation
is dealt with, or in BPSM terminology, is seen as a challenge that
can be met. Support for this integration is not new and initial
steps have already been made by Blascovich (2008) himself. He
has argued that threat can be mapped onto behavioral inhibition
avoidance and challenge onto behavioral approach. The question
becomes: which factors inﬂuence the transition from threat to
challenge?
SELF-ESTEEM
One such factor is self-esteem. Self-esteem can be considered a
trait that determines the extent to which one feels they possess the
resources necessary to cope with obstacles and attain goals. High
self-esteem should make one feel capable of dealing with obsta-
cles, which are therefore experienced as more challenging and less
threatening, facilitating the switch to a behavioral approach state.
High levels of trait self-esteem are linked to behavioral approach
(Baumeister et al., 1989; Heimpel et al., 2006) and it has also been
shown that people with high self-esteem favor approach-oriented
goals over avoidance-oriented goals (Tice, 1991; Cavallo et al.,
2009). With low self-esteem, the transition to approach might
take longer, or fail to occur at all.
In general, self-esteem is related to positive outcomes in life
(Taylor et al., 2003a,b; Swann et al., 2007), but self-esteem has also
been speciﬁcally linked to increased defensiveness against mean-
ing violations. In response to mortality reminders, for example,
people with high levels of self-esteem do not show the typical
defensive behavior seen in response to these violations (Pyszczyn-
ski et al., 2004). For low self-esteem people, however, we observe
the opposite. They appear more cautious and inhibited follow-
ing meaning violations (Vohs and Heatherton, 2001; Cavallo et al.,
2009; McGregor et al., 2009), and it appears as though they reside
longer in the BIS state than people with high self-esteem. This
has negative consequences for well-being, and could even result in
serious psychological disorders, as prolonged exposure to anxious
arousal can lead to depression and PTSD (Routledge et al., 2010;
Pyszczynski and Kesebir, 2011).
NEUROTICISM
A second important factor that inﬂuences the transition from
BIS to BAS is the personality trait neuroticism, such that many
of the responses to meaning violations are enhanced for those
high in neuroticism. Neurotic people are more likely to interpret
evocative cues as a violation. For example, they ﬁnd reminders
of sex a greater violation of meaning because it possibly reminds
them of their mortality (Goldenberg et al., 1999) and they respond
more strongly when their mortality is made more salient explic-
itly (Arndt and Solomon, 2003). Physiologically, they respond
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with increased severity to experiences that arouse uncertainty by
demonstrating a higher negativity response after receiving no feed-
back about how they performed, as compared to receiving positive
or negative feedback about their performance (Hirsh and Inzlicht,
2008). In fact,more thanhalf a century ago, Eysenck (1951) already
proposed that neuroticism is linked to general cortical arousability.
Although the conceptualization of a general physiological
arousal is too vague and likely inaccurate, research has accumu-
lated that demonstrates reliable biological correlates to neuroti-
cism (Canli, 2004; DePascalis, 2004). Several theories suggest that
neuroticism is the result of an especially sensitive neural com-
parator, a mechanism that detects mismatches between actual and
expected states of theworld (Carver and Scheier, 1990; Eisenberger
et al., 2005). As discussed in an earlier section, theACC is responsi-
ble for the detectionof violated expectations or conﬂicts in general.
People high in neuroticism should therefore show increased activ-
ity in theACC in response to discrepancies; a prediction supported
by the ﬁndings of Eisenberger et al. (2005). They found that activ-
ity in the ACC during a discrepancy detection task was positively
correlated with self-reported neuroticism. In line with the use of
the BPSM in this review, neuroticism has been linked to threat
appraisals of stressors, as opposed to challenge appraisals (Schnei-
der, 2004). As a result, they will show prolonged BIS activation
and could beneﬁt from strategies aimed at adopting an approach
orientation.
VALUE AND GOAL COMMITMENT
A ﬁnal example of an individual difference factor that is relevant
to dealing with meaning violations is the extent to which one is
committed to readily activated values and goals. Fluid compen-
sation processes imply that as long as a given meaning violation
does not require an immediate response, there is always the possi-
bility of pursuing more abstract and situation-independent goals,
such as reafﬁrming one’s ideals and establishing new goal pur-
suits. Having these values and goals readily available might affect
the appraisal of violations in terms of challenge. Support for this
idea can be found in an experiment performed by Inzlicht and
Tullett (2010), who primed participants with religion or let par-
ticipants afﬁrm their religious convictions. Interestingly, this led
to reduced ERN activity (i.e., reduced BIS activation), but only for
committed believers. The presence of a readily available value to
pursue can be interpreted as having the resources to deal with the
meaning violation—to feel challenged instead of threatened. Sim-
ilarly, this effect on ERN activity has been found for trait levels of
religious zeal and belief in God (Inzlicht et al., 2009). Additionally,
the afﬁrmationof personal values buffers neuroendocrine andpsy-
chological stress responses, especially so among people with high
self-esteem (Creswell et al., 2005). Adopting meaningful ideolo-
gies, values, or worldviews could therefore be an important step in
not just living a philosophically satisfying life, but also defending
oneself against various meaning violations.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
It is clear that much progress has been made in the
threat-compensation literature in determining how people
respond to various meaning violations. However, certain areas
remain relatively underinvestigated.
Research on the palliative function of approach motivation
is limited. Although it has been shown that approach motiva-
tion leads to reduced signs of BIS activation (Nash et al., 2012),
this has only been shown in the case where approach is mea-
sured before a meaning violation. Nash et al. (2012) measured
baseline levels of approach-related left frontal EEG activity and
found that this predicted a reduced ERN amplitude in response
to conﬂicts in a task that followed. Ideally, we would also observe
physiological markers of approach following meaning violations.
Current research has thus far only demonstrated indirect mea-
sures of approach motivation, for example through self-report,
implicit measures of approach, or the line-bisection task (McGre-
gor et al., 2010). Direct measures of BAS activation have yet to be
investigated.
The ﬁndings we have presented here mostly relate meaning
violations to only a few possible neural substrates of BIS and
BAS activation. However, BIS and BAS are complex psycholog-
ical states that involve many different brain areas. These include
structures related to regulatory functions such as the frontal areas
(e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal regions), but
also areas related to stress such as the amygdala, insula, substantia
nigra and bed nucleus of the stria terminalis complex (Schlund
et al., 2011, 2013). Although these structures could undoubtedly
enhance our understanding of how people respond to meaning
violations, the threat-compensation literature has yet to research
the link between meaning violations and these structures more
concretely.
Most importantly, however, the literature is in need of exper-
imental designs in which the full process, from violation to
approach, is tested. These experiments would involve partici-
pants being presented with a meaning violation: a reminder of
mortality, goal uncertainty, the loss of control, perceptual anoma-
lies, or cognitive conﬂict, more generally. This should result in
direct activation of the BIS as reﬂected by activity in the ACC or
related neutral structures and peripheral measures of arousal such
as cardiac activity or skin conductance. After a delay, or when an
opportunity is presented to afﬁrm one’s personal values, the moti-
vation to approach should bemade visible, throughmeasures such
as the line bisection task (indirectly) or neural activity in the left
prefrontal lobe (directly). Following this approach state, measures
of BIS should show reduced activity, thereby conﬁrming the pallia-
tive functioning of approach. So far no studies have been reported
that fully present this process.
Further research might also focus on practical applications
of these ﬁndings. The research on individual differences in the
response to meaning violations have shown that having read-
ily available sources of meaning can help reduce the anxiety in
response to threats. Also, framing goals in an approach-oriented
manner is conducive to well-being. These ﬁndings could poten-
tially translate to therapeutic settings where greater emphasis is
put on having valued sources of meaning in one’s life. These often
abstract sources—ideologies, moral systems, worldviews—have
the beneﬁt of being relatively easily accessible and their abstract
nature might also make them less likely to be thwarted by sit-
uational constraints (see, McGregor et al., 2012). Their pursuit
can largely go unhindered, therefore serving as an effective coping
strategy.
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CONCLUSION
Meaning violations evoke a speciﬁc stress response that beginswith
a defensive reactionmarked by anxiety, vigilance, and avoidance—
a state of behavioral inhibition. People respond to this aversive
state by approaching their values, ideologies, and worldviews. We
suggest, in line with the BPSM of arousal regulation, that all
meaning violations initially cause an inhibitory threat-response
that subsequently switches to a state of approach; especially when
factors such as self-esteem, personality, and the availability of com-
mitments impact one’s appraisal of the situation. Nevertheless, it
is not the content of afﬁrmed values, ideologies, or worldviews
that alleviates stress, but rather the state of approach—in and of
itself—that people ﬁnd comforting. This integration of ﬁndings
across the threat-compensation literature is but one among many
in a recent surge of integrative efforts in this ﬁeld (e.g., Jonas et al.,
2014).We expect these developments will provide new insight into
the this literature, as well as well related ﬁelds of research.
REFERENCES
Allen, J. J. B., Harmon-Jones, E., and Cavender, J. (2001). Manipulation of frontal
EEG asymmetry through biofeedback alters self- reported emotional responses
and facial EMG. Psychophysiology 38, 685–693. doi: 10.1111/1469-8986.3840685
Allen, J. J., Iacono, W. G., Depue, R. A., and Arbisi, P. (1993). Regional
electroencephalographic asymmetries in bipolar seasonal affective disorder
before and after exposure to bright light. Biol. Psychiatry 33, 642–646. doi:
10.1016/0006-3223(93)90104-L
Allport, G. W. (1943). The ego in contemporary psychology. Psychol. Rev. 50, 451–
478. doi: 10.1037/h0055375
Amodio, D. M., Master, S. L., Yee, C. M., and Taylor, S. E. (2008). Neurocognitive
components of the behavioral inhibition and activation systems: implications
for theories of self-regulation. Psychophysiology 45, 11–19. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2007.00609.x
Amodio, D. M., Shah, J. Y., Sigelman, J., Brazy, P. C., and Harmon-Jones, E.
(2004). Implicit regulatory focus associated with asymmetrical frontal corti-
cal activity. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 40, 225–232. doi: 10.1016/S0022-1031(03)
00100-8
Arndt, J., and Solomon, S. (2003). The control of death and the death of con-
trol: the effects of mortality salience, neuroticism, and worldview threat on
the desire for control. J. Res. Pers. 37, 1–22. doi: 10.1016/S0092-6566(02)
00530-5
Baumeister, R. F., Tice, D. M., and Hutton, D. G. (1989). Self-presentational moti-
vations and personality differences in self-esteem. J. Pers. 57, 547–579. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-6494.1989.tb02384.x
Berkman, E. T., and Lieberman, M. D. (2010). Approaching the bad and avoiding
the good: lateral prefrontal cortical asymmetry distinguishes between action and
valence. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 22, 1970–1979. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.21317
Blascovich, J. (2008). “Challenge and threat appraisal,” in Handbook of Approach and
Avoidance Motivation, ed. A. J. Elliot (New York: Psychology Press), 431–445.
Blascovich, J., Mendes, W. B., Hunter, S. B., Lickel, B., and Kowai-Bell, N. (2001).
Perceiver threat in social interactions with stigmatized others. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
80, 253–267. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.80.2.253
Blascovich, J., and Tomaka, J. (1996). “The biopsychosocial model of arousal reg-
ulation,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 28, ed. M. Zanna
(New York: Academic Press), 1–51.
Bolling, D. Z., Pelphrey, K. A., and Vander Wyk, B. C. (2012). Dif-
ferential brain responses to social exclusion by one’s own versus oppo-
site gender peers. Soc. Neurosci. 7, 331–346. doi: 10.1080/17470919.2011.
623181
Bolling, D. Z., Pitskel, N. B., Deen, B., Crowley, M. J., McPartland, J. C.,
Mayes, L. C., et al. (2011). Dissociable brain mechanisms for process-
ing social exclusion and rule violation. Neuroimage 54, 2462–2471. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.10.049
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., and Cohen, J. D.
(2001). Conﬂict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychol. Rev. 108, 624–652.
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.108.3.624
Brehm, J.W. (2007). A brief history of dissonance theory. Soc. Pers. Psychol. Compass
1, 381–391. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00035.x
Bruner, J. S., and Postman, L. (1949). On the perception of incongruity: a paradigm.
J. Pers. 18, 206–223. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1949.tb01241.x
Burke, B. L., Martens, A., and Faucher, E. H. (2010). Two decades of terror man-
agement theory: a meta-analysis of mortality salience research. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
Rev. 14, 155–195. doi: 10.1177/1088868309352321
Bush, G., Luu, P., and Posner, M. I. (2000). Cognitive and emotional inﬂuences
in anterior cingulated cortex. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 215–222. doi: 10.1016/S1364-
6613(00)01483-2
Canli, T. (2004). Functional brain mapping of extraversion and neuroticism: learn-
ing from individual differences in emotion processing. J. Pers. 72, 1105–1132. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-6494.2004.00292.x
Carter-Sowell, A. R., Chen, Z., and Williams, K. D. (2008). Ostracism increases
social susceptibility. Soc. Inﬂuence 3, 143–153. doi: 10.1080/15534510802204868
Carver, C. S. (2004). Negative affects deriving from the behavioral approach system.
Emotion 4, 3–22. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.4.1.3
Carver, C. S., and Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of positive and
negative affect: a control-process view. Psychol. Rev. 97, 19–35. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.97.1.19
Carver, C. S., and White, T. L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation,
and affective responses to impending reward and punishment: the BIS/BAS scales.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 67, 319–333. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.67.2.319
Cavallo, J. V., Fitzsimons, G. M., and Holmes, J. G. (2009). Taking chances in the face
of threat: romantic risk regulation and approach motivation. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
Bull. 35, 737–751. doi: 10.1177/0146167209332742
Chiu, P. H., and Deldin, P. J. (2007). Neural evidence for enhanced error
detection in major depressive disorder. Am. J. Psychiatry 164, 608–616. doi:
10.1176/appi.ajp.164.4.608
Coan, J. A., and Allen, J. J. B. (2003). Frontal EEG asymmetry and the behav-
ioral activation and inhibition systems. Psychophysiology 40, 106–114. doi:
10.1111/1469-8986.00011
Corkin, S., Twitchell, T. E., and Sullivan, E. V. (1979). “Safety and efﬁcacy of cin-
gulotomy for pain and psychiatric disorder,” in Modern Concepts in Psychiatric
Surgery, eds E. R.Hitchcock,H. T. Jr. Ballantine, and B.A.Meyerson (Amsterdam:
Elsevier), 253–272.
Creswell, J. D., Welch, W. T., Taylor, S. E., Sherman, D. K., Gruenewald, T. L.,
and Mann, T. (2005). Afﬁrmation of personal values buffers neuroendocrine and
psychological stress responses. Psychol. Sci. 16, 846–851. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2005.01624.x
Critchley, H. D., Mathias, C. J., Josephs, O., O’Doherty, J., Zanini, S., Dewar,
B.-K., et al. (2003). Human cingulate cortex and autonomic control: con-
verging neuroimaging and clinical evidence. Brain 126, 2139–2152. doi:
10.1093/brain/awg216
Croyle, R. T., and Cooper, J. (1983). Dissonance arousal: physiological evidence.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 45, 782–791. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.45.4.782
Davidson, R. J. (1992). Anterior cerebral asymmetry and the nature of emotion.
Brain Cogn. 20, 125–151. doi: 10.1016/0278-2626(92)90065-T
Davidson, R. J. (2004). What does the prefrontal cortex “do” in affect: per-
spectives in frontal EEG asymmetry research. Biol. Psychol. 67, 219–234. doi:
10.1016/j.biopsycho.2004.03.008
Dehaene, S., Posner, M. I., and Tucker, D. M. (1994). Localization of a neural
system for error detection and compensation. Psychol. Sci. 5, 303–305. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.1994.tb00630.x
DePascalis, V. (2004). “On the psychophysiology of extraversion,” in On the Psy-
chobiology of Personality: Essays inHonor ofMarvin Zuckerman ed. R.M. Stelmack
(New York: Elsevier Science), 295–327.
Drake,R., andMyers, L. (2006).Visual attention, emotion, and action tendency: feel-
ing active or passive. Cogn. Emot. 20, 608–622. doi: 10.1080/02699930500368105
Eisenberger, N. I., Lieberman, M. D., and Satpute, A. B. (2005). Personality from
a controlled processing perspective: an fMRI study of neuroticism, extraver-
sion, and self-consciousness. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 5, 169–181. doi:
10.3758/CABN.5.2.169
Eisenberger, N. I., Lieberman, M. D., and Williams, K. D. (2003). Does rejec-
tion hurt? An fMRI study of social exclusion. Science 302, 290–292. doi:
10.1126/science.1089134
Elkin, R. A., and Leippe, M. R. (1986). Physiological arousal, dissonance, and
attitude change: evidence for a dissonance-arousal link and a “don’t remind me”
effect. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 51, 55–65. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.55
www.frontiersin.org January 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1568 | 7
Sleegers and Proulx The comfort of approach
Elliot, A. J. (2008). Handbook of Approach and Avoidance Motivation. New York:
Psychology Press.
Elliot, A. J., Gable, S. L., and Mapes, R. R. (2006). Approach and avoidance
motivation in the social domain. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 32, 378–391. doi:
10.1177/0146167205282153
Elliot, A. J., and Sheldon, K. M. (1997). Avoidance achievement motivation: a
personal goals analysis. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 73, 171–185. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.73.1.171
Eysenck, H. J. (1951). The organization of personality. J. Pers. 20, 101–117. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-6494.1951.tb01515.x
Falkenstein, M., Hohnsbein, J., Hoormann, J., and Blanke, L., (1990). “Effects of
errors in choice reaction tasks on the ERP under focused and divided attention,”
in Psychophysiological Brain Research, eds. C. H. M. Brunia, A. W. K. Gaillard, and
A. Kok (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press), 192–195.
Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Fox, N. A. (1991). If it’s not left, it’s right. Electroencephalograph asym-
metry and the development of emotion. Am. Psychol. 46, 863–872. doi:
10.1037/0003-066X.46.8.863
Gehring, W. J., Goss, B., Coles, M. G. H., Meyer, D. E., and Donchin, E. (1993). A
neural system for error detection and compensation. Psychol. Sci. 4, 385–390. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.tb00586.x
Gehring, W. J., Himle, J., and Nisenson, L. G. (2000). Action monitoring
dysfunction in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychol. Sci. 11, 1–6. doi:
10.1111/1467-9280.00206
Gerard, H. B. (1967). Choice difﬁculty, dissonance, and the decision sequence.
J. Pers. 35, 91–108. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1967.tb01417.x
Germans, M. K., and Kring, A. M. (2000). Hedonic deﬁcit in anhedonia: sup-
port for the role of approach motivation. Pers. Individ. Dif. 28, 659–672. doi:
10.1016/S0191-8869(99)00129-4
Goldenberg, J. L., Pyszczynski, T., McCoy, S. K., Greenberg, J., and Solomon, S.
(1999). Death, sex, love, and neuroticism: why is sex such a problem? J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 77, 1173–1187. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1173
Gray, J. A. (1982). The Neuropsychology of Anxiety. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Gray, J. A., and McNaughton, N. (2003). The Neuropsychology of Anxiety. NewYork,
NY: Oxford University Press.
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., and Schwartz, J. L. (1998). Measuring individual
differences in implicit cognition: the implicit association test. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
74, 1464–1480. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464
Hajcak, G., and Foti, D. (2008). Errors are aversive: defensive motivation and
the error-related negativity. Psychol. Sci. 19, 103–108. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2008.02053.x
Hajcak, G., Franklin, M., Foa, E., and Simons, R. (2008). Increased error-
related brain activity in pediatric obsessive-compulsive disorder before and after
treatment. Am. J. Psychiatry 165, 116–123. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2007.07010143
Hajcak, G., McDonald, N., and Simons, R. F. (2003). To err is autonomic: Error-
related brain potentials, ANS activity, and post-error compensatory behavior.
Psychophysiology 40, 895–903. doi: 10.1111/1469-8986.00107
Hajcak,G.,McDonald,N., and Simons, R. F. (2004). Error-related psychophysiology
and negative affect. Brain Cogn. 56, 189–197. doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2003.11.001
Hajcak, G., and Simons, R. F. (2002). Error-related brain activity in obsessive-
compulsive undergraduates. Psychiatry Res. 110, 63–72. doi: 10.1016/S0165-
1781(02)00034-3
Harmon-Jones, E. (2003). Clarifying the emotive functions of asymmetrical frontal
cortical activity. Psychophysiology 40, 838–848. doi: 10.1111/1469-8986.00121
Harmon-Jones, E., and Allen, J. J. B. (1997). Behavioral activation sensitiv-
ity and resting frontal eeg asymmetry: covariation of putative indicators
related to risk for mood disorders. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 106, 159–163. doi:
10.1037//0021-843X.106.1.159
Harmon-Jones, E., and Allen, J. J. B. (1998). Anger and frontal brain activity:
EEG asymmetry consistent with approach motivation despite negative affec-
tive valence. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 74, 1310–1316. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.
5.1310
Harmon-Jones, E., Brehm, J. W., Greenberg, J., Simon, L., and Nelson, D. E. (1996).
Evidence that the production of aversive consequences is not necessary to create
cognitive dissonance. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 70, 5–16. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.
70.1.5
Harmon-Jones, E., Gerdjikov, T., and Harmon-Jones, C. (2008). The effect
of induced compliance on relative left frontal cortical activity: a test of the
action-based model of dissonance. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 35–45. doi:
10.1002/ejsp.399
Hawkley, L. C., Williams, K. D., and Cacioppo, J. T. (2011). Responses to
ostracism across adulthood. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 6, 234–243. doi:
10.1093/scan/nsq045
Heimpel, S. A., Elliot, A. J., and Wood, J. V. (2006). Basic personality dispositions,
self-esteem, and personal goals: an approach-avoidance analysis. J. Pers. 74, 1293–
1320. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2006.00410.x
Heine, S. J., Proulx, T., and Vohs, K. D. (2006). The meaning maintenance model:
on the coherence of social motivations. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 10, 88–110. doi:
10.1207/s15327957pspr1002_1
Henriques, J. B., and Davidson, R. J. (1990). Regional brain electrical asymme-
tries discriminate between previously depressed and healthy control subjects.
J. Abnorm. Psychol. 99, 22–31. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.99.1.22
Hirsh, J. B., and Inzlicht, M. (2008). The devil you know: neuroticism predicts
neural response to uncertainty. Psychol. Sci. 19, 962–967. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2008.02183.x
Hogg, M. A. (2007). “Uncertainty-identity theory,” in Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology, Vol. 39, ed. M. P. Zanna (San Diego, CA: Academic Press),
69–126.
Holroyd, C. B., and Coles, M. G. H. (2002). The neural basis of human error
processing: reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related negativity.
Psychol. Rev. 109, 679–709. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.109.4.679
Inzlicht, M., McGregor, I., Hirsh, J. B., and Nash, K. (2009). Neural mark-
ers of religious conviction. Psychol. Sci. 20, 385–392. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2009.02305.x
Inzlicht, M., and Tullett, A. M. (2010). Reﬂecting on God: religious primes can
reduce neurophysiological response to errors. Psychol. Sci. 21, 1184–1190. doi:
10.1177/0956797610375451
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1992). Shattered assumptions: towards a new psychology of
trauma. New York: Free Press.
Jonas, E., McGregor, I., Klackl, J., Agroskin, D., Fritsche, I., Holbrook, C., et al.
(2014). “Threat and defense: from anxiety to approach,” in Advances in Exper-
imental Social Psychology, eds J. M. Olson and M. P. Zanna (San Diego, CA:
Academic Press), 219–286.
Jones, N. A., and Fox, N. A. (1992). Electroencephalogram asymmetry during emo-
tionally evocative ﬁlms and its relation to positive and negative affectivity. Brain
Cogn. 20, 280–299. doi: 10.1016/0278-2626(92)90021-D
Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., McGregor, I., and Nash, K. (2010). Religious
belief as compensatory control. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 14, 37–48. doi:
10.1177/1088868309353750
Kay, A. C., Whitson, J. A., Gaucher, D., and Galinsky, A. D. (2009). Compensatory
control: Achieving order through the mind, our institutions, and the heavens.
Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 18, 264–268. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01649.x
Kitayama, S., Chua, H. F., Tompson, S., and Han, S. (2013). Neural mechanisms
of dissonance: An fMRI investigation of choice justiﬁcation. Neuroimage 69,
206–212. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.11.034
Kruglanski, A. W., Orehek, E., Dechesne, M., and Pierro, A. (2010). Lay epistemic
theory: the motivational, cognitive, and social aspects of knowledge forma-
tion. Soc. Pers. Psychol. Compass 4, 939–950. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.
00308.x
Losch, M. E., and Cacioppo, J. T. (1990). Cognitive dissonance may enhance
sympathetic tonus, but attitudes are changed to reduce negative affect rather
than arousal. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 26, 289–304. doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(90)
90040-S
Luu, P., Collins, P., and Tucker, D. M. (2000). Mood, personality, and self- mon-
itoring: negative affect and emotionality in relation to frontal lobe mechanisms
of error monitoring. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 129, 43–60. doi: 10.1037/0096-
3445.129.1.43
Maner, J. K., DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., and Schaller, M. (2007). Does
social exclusion motivate interpersonal reconnection? Resolving the “porcupine
problem.”J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 92, 42–55. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.92.1.42
Masten,C. L., Eisenberger,N. I., Borofsky, L.A., Pfeifer, J.H.,McNealy,K.,Mazziotta,
J., et al. (2009). Neural correlates of social exclusion during adolescence: under-
standing the distress of peer rejection. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 4, 143–157. doi:
10.1093/scan/nsp007
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition January 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1568 | 8
Sleegers and Proulx The comfort of approach
McGregor, I.,Nash,K.A., and Inzlicht,M. (2009). Threat, high self-esteem, and reac-
tive approach-motivation: electroencephalographic evidence. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.
45, 1003–1007. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.011
McGregor, I., Nash, K., Mann, N., and Phills, C. E. (2010). Anxious uncertainty
and reactive approach motivation (RAM). J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 99, 133–147. doi:
10.1037/a0019701
McGregor, I., Prentice, M., and Nash, K. (2012). Approaching relief: compensatory
ideals relieve threat-induced anxiety by promoting approach-motivated states.
Soc. Cogn. 30, 689–714. doi: 10.1521/soco.2012.30.6.689
Mendes, W. B., Blascovich, J., Hunter, S. B., Lickel, B., and Jost, J. T. (2007).
Threatened by the unexpected: physiological responses during social interac-
tions with expectancy-violating partners. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 92, 698–716. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.92.4.698
Mendes, W. B., Blascovich, J., Lickel, B., and Hunter, S. (2002). Challenge and
threat during interactions with White and Black men. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 28,
939–952. doi: 10.1177/014616720202800707
Miltner, W. H. R., Braun, C. H., and Coles, M. G. H. (1997). Event- related brain
potentials following incorrect feedback in a time-estimation task: evidence for a
“generic” neural system for error detec- tion. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 9, 788–798. doi:
10.1162/jocn.1997.9.6.788
Moor, B. G., Crone, E. A., and van der Molen, M. W. (2010). The heartbrake of
social rejection: heart rate deceleration in response to unexpected peer rejection.
Psychol. Sci. 21, 1326–1333. doi: 10.1177/0956797610379236
Moor, B. G., Guroglu, B., Op de Macks, Z. A., Rombouts, S. A., Van der Molen,
M. W., and Crone, E. A. (2012). Social exclusion and punishment of excluders:
neural correlates and developmental trajectories. Neuroimage 59, 708–717. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.07.028
Monat,A.,Averill, J., andLazarus, R. (1972). Anticipatory stress and coping reactions
under various conditions of uncertainty. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 24, 237–253. doi:
10.1037/h0033297
Morecraft, R. J., and Van Hoesen, G. W. (1998). Convergence of limbic input to the
cingulate motor cortex in the rhesus monkey. Brain Res. Bull. 45, 209–232. doi:
10.1016/S0361-9230(97)00344-4
Nash, K., Inzlicht, M., and McGregor, I. D. (2012). Approach-related left prefrontal
EEG asymmetry predictsmuted error-related negativity. Biol. Psychol. 91, 96–102.
doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2012.05.005
Nash, K., McGregor, I., and Inzlicht, M. (2010). Line bisection as a neural marker
of approach motivation. Psychophysiology 47, 979–983. doi:10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2010.00999.x
Nieuwenhuis, S., Holroyd, C. B., Mol, N., and Coles, M. G. (2004). Reinforcement-
related brain potentials from medial frontal cortex: origins and functional
signiﬁcance. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 28, 441–448. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2004.
05.003
Nieuwenhuis, S.,Yeung,N., vandenWildenberg,W., andRidderinkhof,K.R. (2003).
Electrophysiological correlates of anterior cingulate function in a Go/NoGo task:
Effects of response conﬂict and trial-type frequency. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci.
3, 17–26. doi: 10.3758/CABN.3.1.17
Oliveira, F. T. P.,McDonald, J. J., andGoodman,D. (2007). Performancemonitoring
in the anterior cingulate is not all error related: expectancy deviation and the
representation of action-outcome associations. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19, 1994–2004.
doi: 10.1162/jocn.2007.19.12.1994
Pandya, D. N., van Hoesen, G. W., and Mesulam, M. M. (1981). Efferent connec-
tions of the cingulate gyrus in the monkey. Exp. Brain Res. 42, 319–330. doi:
10.1007/BF00237497
Pizzagalli, D. A., Sherwood, R. J., Henriques, J. B., and Davidson, R. J. (2005).
Frontal brain asymmetry and reward responsiveness. Psychol. Sci. 16, 805–813.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01618.x
Proulx, T. (2012). Threat-compensation in social psychology: is there a core
motivation? Soc. Cogn. 30, 643–641. doi: 10.1521/soco.2012.30.6.643
Proulx, T., and Inzlicht, M. (2012). The ﬁve ‘A’s of meaning maintenance: mak-
ing sense of the theories of sense-making. Psychol. Inq. 23, 317–335. doi:
10.1080/1047840X.2012.702372
Proulx, T., Inzlicht, M., and Harmon-Jones, E. (2012). Understanding all inconsis-
tency compensation as a palliative response to violated expectations. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 16, 285–291. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2012.04.002
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., and Schimel, J. (2004). Why do
people need self-esteem? A theoretical and empirical review. Psychol. Bull. 130,
435–468. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.130.3.435
Pyszczynski, T., and Kesebir, P. (2011). Anxiety buffer disruption theory: a terror
management account of posttraumatic stress disorder. Anxiety Stress Coping 24,
3–26. doi: 10.1080/10615806.2010.517524
Quirin, M., Loktyushin, A., Arndt, J., Kustermann, E., Lo, Y. Y., Kuhl, J., et al. (2012).
Existential neuroscience: a functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation
of neural responses to reminders of one’s mortality. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 7,
193–198. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsq106
Routledge, C., Ostaﬁn, B., Juhl, J., Sedikides, C., Cathey, C., and Liao, J. (2010).
Adjusting to death: the effects of mortality salience and self-esteem on psycho-
logical well-being, growth motivation, and maladaptive behavior. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 99, 897–916. doi: 10.1037/a0021431
Salomons, T. V., Johnstone, T., Backonja, M. M., and Davidson, R. J. (2004). Per-
ceived controllability modulates the neural response to pain. J. Neurosci. 24,
7199–7203. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1315-04.2004
Schlund, M. W., Hudgins, C. D., Magee, S., and Dymond, S. (2013). Neuroimaging
the temporal dynamics of human avoidance to sustained threat. Behav. Brain Res.
257:148–155. doi: 10.1016/j.bbr.2013.09.042
Schlund, M. W., Magee, S., and Hudgins, C. D. (2011). Human avoidance
and approach learning: evidence for overlapping neural systems and experien-
tial avoidance modulation of avoidance neurocircuitry. Behav. Brain Res. 225,
437–448. doi: 10.1016/j.bbr.2011.07.054
Schneider, T. R. (2004). The role of neuroticism on psychological and physiological
stress responses. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 40, 795–804. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2004.04.005
Steele, C. M., and Liu, T. J. (1983). Dissonance processes as self-afﬁrmation. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 45, 5–19. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.5
Sutton, S. K., and Davidson, R. J. (1997). Prefrontal brain asymmetry: a biological
substrate of behavioral approach and inhibition systems. Psychol. Sci. 8, 204–210.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.1997.tb00413.x
Swann, W. B., Chang-Schneider, C., and Larsen McClarty, K. (2007). Do people’s
self-views matter? Self-concept and self-esteem in everyday life. Am. Psychol. 62,
84–94. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.62.2.84
Swann, W. B. Jr., and Read, S. J. (1981). Self-veriﬁcation processes: how we sustain
our self-conceptions. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 17, 351–372. doi: 10.1016/0022-
1031(81)90043-3
Taylor, S. E., Lerner, J. S., Sherman, D. K., Sage, R. M., and McDowell, N. K. (2003a).
Are self-enhancing cognitions associated with healthy or unhealthy biological
proﬁles? J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 85, 605–615. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.85.4.605
Taylor, S. E., Lerner, J. S., Sherman, D. K., Sage, R. M., and McDowell, N. K. (2003b).
Portrait of the self-enhancer: well-adjusted and well-liked or maladjusted and
friendless? J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 84, 165–176. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.84.1.165
Tice, D. M. (1991). Esteem protection or enhancement? Self-handicapping motives
and attributions differ by trait self-esteem. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 60, 711–725. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.60.5.711
Tullett, A., Prentice, M., Nash, K., Teper, R., Inzlicht, M., and McGregor, I. (2013).
“Neural foundations of meaning and threat,” in The Psychology of Meaning, eds K.
Markman, T. Proulx, and M. Linberg (Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association), 401–419.
Urry, H. L., Nitschke, J. B., Dolski, I., Jackson, D. C., Dalton, K. M., Mueller, C. J.,
et al. (2004). Making a life worth living neural correlates of well-being. Psychol.
Sci. 15, 367–372. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00686.x
Van Beest, I., and Scheepers, D. (2013). Challenge and threat responses to
anger communication in coalition formation. J. Econ. Psychol. 38, 50–57. doi:
10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.005
van den Bos, K. (2001). Uncertainty management: the inﬂuence of uncertainty
salience on reactions to perceived procedural fairness. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 80,
931–941. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.80.6.931
van den Bos, K., van Ameijde, J., and van Gorp, H. (2006). On the psychology of
religion: The role of personal uncertainty in religious worldview defense. Basic
Appl. Soc. Psychol. 28, 333–341. doi: 10.1207/s15324834basp2804_6
Van Hoesen, G. W., Morecraft, R. J., and Vogt, B. A. (1993). “Connections of the
monkey cingulate cortex,”Neurobiology of Cingulate Cortex and Limbic Thalamus,
eds Vogt and M. Gabriel (Boston: Birkhäuser), 249–284.
van Honk, J., and Schutter, D. J. L. G. (2006). From affective valence to motivational
direction: the frontal asymmetry of emotion revised. Psychol. Sci. 17, 963–965.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01813.x
van Veen, V., and Carter, C. S. (2002). The timing of action-monitoring pro-
cesses in the anterior cingulate cortex. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 14, 593–602. doi:
10.1162/08989290260045837
www.frontiersin.org January 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1568 | 9
Sleegers and Proulx The comfort of approach
van Veen, V., Krug, M. K., Schooler, J. W., and Carter, C. S. (2009). Neural activity
predicts attitude change in cognitive dissonance. Nat. Neurosci. 12, 1469–1474.
doi: 10.1038/nn.2413
Vogt, B. A., Sikes, R. W., and Vogt. L. J. (1993). “Anterior cingulate cortex and the
medial pain system,” in Neurobiology of Cingulate Cortex and Limbic Thalamus
eds B. A. Vogt and M. Gabriel (Boston: Birkhäuser), 313–344.
Vohs,K.D., andHeatherton,T. F. (2001). Self-esteemand threats to self: Implications
for self-construals and interpersonal perceptions. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 81, 1103–
1118. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.81.6.1103
Wheeler, R. E., Davidson, R. J., and Tomarken,A. J. (1993). Frontal brain asymmetry
and emotional reactivity: a biological substrate of affective style. Psychophysiology
30, 82–89. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.1993.tb03207.x
Williams, K. D. (2007). Ostracism. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 58, 425–452. doi:
10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085641
Williams, K. D. (2009). “Ostracism: a temporal need-threat model,” in Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 41, ed. M. Zanna (New York, NY: Academic
Press), 279–314.
Yeung, N., Botvinick, M. M., and Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural basis of error-
detection: conﬂict monitoring and the error-related negativity. Psychol. Rev. 111,
931–959. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.111.4.939
Zimmer-Gembeck, M. J., and Skinner, E. A. (2010). Review: the development of
coping across childhood and adolescence: an integrative review and critique of
research. Int. J. Behav. Dev. 35, 1–17. doi: 10.1177/0165025410384923
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the researchwas conducted
in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Received: 11 June 2014; accepted: 17 December 2014; published online: 09 January
2015.
Citation: Sleegers WWA and Proulx T (2015) The comfort of approach: self-soothing
effects of behavioral approach in response to meaning violations. Front. Psychol. 5:1568.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01568
This article was submitted to Cognition, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2015 Sleegers and Proulx. This is an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution
or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor
are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with
accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which
does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition January 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1568 | 10
